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Labor  Law-REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-NLRB WILL NO 
LONGER PROBE INTO TRUTH OR F A L S I ~  OF PARTIES' CAMPAIGN 
STATEMENTS-Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 
1705 (NLRB 1977). 
Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc. (the employer) objected to 
the outcome of a labor representation election won by the Retail 
Clerks, Local 99, AFL-CIO (the union). The employer's objection 
was based on a significant misrepresentation, made by the 
union's business representative, of the employer's profits.* The 
Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB 
or the Board) overruled the employer's objection and certified the 
union as the employees' bargaining representative. On review, 
the Board affirmed the Regional Director's certification2 and 
overruled its longstanding rule%f overturning elections because 
of campaign misrepresentations. 
A. NLRB Supervision of Representation Elections 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4 gives 
employees the right to choose, or refrain from choosing, a collec- 
tive bargaining repre~entative.~ A bargaining representative cho- 
sen by the majority of employees becomes "the exclusive 
[representative] of all the employees . . . for the purposes of 
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of ernpl~yment."~ One method 
of determining the majority status of a collective bargaining rep- 
resentative is an NLRB-conducted representation election.' 
1. The day before the election, the union's representative had told the employees that 
the employer's profits for the last year had totaled $500,000. In fact, the employer's profits 
had only totaled about $50,000. 
2. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1705 (NLRB 1977). 
3. The rule is stated in Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). 
4. 29 U.S.C. $4 151-168 (1970). 
5. Id. Q 157. 
6. Id. Q 159(a). 
7. 1 J .  JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 3.1 (I=): "Petitions for such an election may be filed 
by (1) the employees, (2) any individual or labor organization acting on behalf of the 
employees, or (3) by an employer confronted with a claim from an individual or labor 
organization." 
Before the Board can order an election, it must find that "a question of representation 
affecting commerce exists." 29 U.S.C. 4 159(c)(l) (1970). Affecting commerce means "in 
commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having 
led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free 
flow of commerce." Id. Q 152. "A question concerning representation exists when it  is 
necessary to determine the majority status of one or more labor organizations [or neither] 
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Beyond the requirement that elections be conducted by se- 
cret ballot,qhe NLRA itself does not spell out the procedures for 
the conduct of representation elections. Moreover, the Act "has 
been interpreted as granting the NLRB 'a wide degree of discre- 
tion' in establishing" election rules and procedures and in deter- 
mining the validity of election results.' 
The Board has declared that manifestation of employees' 
free choice is a purpose of representation elections.1° By regulat- 
ing campaign conduct, the NLRB seeks to ensure that the em- 
ployees are able to make a "reasoned, untrammeled choice" of a 
bargaining representative.ll In order to protect the employees' 
freedom of choice from improper employer or union influences, 
the Board has sought to provide a "laboratory" in which condi- 
tions are as "nearly ideal as possible" for determining the 
"uninhibited desires of the employees."12 Laboratory conditions 
exist when, in the Board's opinion, there has been no interference 
with the employees' free choice of their bargaining representa- 
tive.13 Once the NLRB concludes that there has been interference 
with free choice, the "automatic sanction" is invalidation of the 
election. l4 
in an appropriate unit." 1 J. JENKINS, supra § 3.1. 
The Board will not conduct a representation election unless it is shown that 30% or 
more of the employees support the petition, or election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(l) (1970); 29 
C.F.R. 4 101.18 (1976). 
8. 29 U.S.C. 5 159(c)(l) (1970). Pursuant to its rulemaking authority granted by 5 6 
of the NLRA, the Board has promulgated procedural regulations for the conduct of repre- 
sentation elections and the filing of objections to representation elections in 29 C.F.R. $ 0  
101.17-.21, 102 (1976). 
9. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULA~ON F ELECTION CONDUCT 4 
(Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974) (quoting NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 
329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946)). 
The courts have recognized that the Board's view on the regulation of preelection 
propaganda should be granted deference because of the Board's expertise in that area. 
Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1974). 
10. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). 
11. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69 (1962). The right of the employees to a 
bargaining representative of their own choosing is guaranteed by 7 of the NLRA; the 
Board regulates campaign propaganda to ensure that there has been no interference with 
that right. Id. 
12. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). When there has been interfer- 
ence with the employees' free choice, laboratory conditions have been breached and the 
election must be reconducted so that the free choice of the employees may be determined. 
Id. 
13. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). 
"[vhe 'laboratory conditions' doctrine . . . is of such an ambiquous [sic] nature 
that it has been subjected to a multitude of interpretations, none of which have outlasted 
their author's Board tenure." R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. Hum, SUPM note 9, a t  11. 
14. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. Hum, supra note 9, at 5. 
210 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
No definitive statement can be made, however, as to what 
conduct will be found to interfere with the employees' freedom of 
choice;15 the Board's composition a t  a given time is likely to be 
determinative.16 The Board's standards for the regulation of cam- 
paign conduct have been developed on a case-by-case basis," and 
have often been applied inconsistently.18 In addition, the Board 
has apparently applied a double standard when evaluating cam- 
paign conduct19-interference with employee free choice is more 
readily found when employer interference is alleged than when 
union interference is claimed.20 For these reasons, the Board's 
- - -  
15. The Board regulates campaign conduct that is "deemed likely to coerce, mislead, 
or otherwise improperly influence the voters." R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, supra 
note 9, a t  12. Campaign conduct includes all of the acts of the union and employer during 
the critical preelection period that are calculated to influence the employees to vote for 
or against the union. See generally id. The critical preelection period is the period between 
the time the election petition is filed and the time the election is conducted. Ideal Elec. 
& Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961). 
By protecting the employees' free choice, the Board seeks to prevent interference 
"with an informed and reasoned assessment of the consequences of selecting a union." 
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 47 (1964). 
16. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, supra note 9, at 6. 
17. Id. "[qhe Board's election case rulings have often tended to be narrow and 
limited to particular fact situations, and few comprehensive statements of election policy 
have emerged." Id. 
18. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND REALITY 21 (1976). 
19. Raskin, Deregulation of Union Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment 
Balance, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (1976): "[Tlhe standards applied by the Labor 
Board have been so imprecise and usually so one-sided in their definition of what is 
coercive that they offend both fairness and reason." 
On at least two occasions the courts have disapproved of the Board's unfair applica- 
tion of a double standard. See Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1972); 
NLRB v. Sanitary Laundry, Inc., 441 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1971). 
20. Smither, Does the Goalpost Move When Employers Kick About Union Miscon- 
duct During Elections?, 25 LAB. L.J. 578, 578 (1974): 
[unions . . . file objections almost twice as frequently as employers but 
their success rate since 1969 has been approximately three times that of employ- 
ers, and in 1970 the probability that the Board would sustain objections filed 
by a union was four times greater than in the case of employer objections. 
Employer statements are more likely to be found coercive because the employer is in a 
position to carry out his threats while the union is not. Id. a t  581. See also Fairweather, 
What Can Employers Do in Election Campaigns?, 17 N.Y. CONF. LAB. 183 (1964). 
The lack of definition, the inconsistency, and the one-sidedness of the NLRB's regula- 
tion of campaign conduct, however, have not prevented the NLRB from maintaining its 
claim of expertise in determining when campaign conduct has interfered with the employ- 
ees' free choice. J. GEWAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, supra note 18, at 4 n.20. The courts 
have accepted the Board's claim of expertise as fact. Id. 
The source of the Board's expertise is found in the "sheer volume of cases handled." 
Smither, supra at 581. One court has said that "[flrom its supervision and review of 
thousands of representation elections each year, no area is more within the expertise of 
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regulation of election conduct has been widely ~r i t ic ized.~~ 
The issue in an election interference case is not whether there 
has been an unfair labor practice; rather, the question centers on 
whether there has been interference with the employees' free 
choice.22 An unfair labor practice need not be shown.23 In fact, 
propaganda that interferes with free choice encompasses a 
broader range of propaganda than does the related class of unfair 
labor practices. Unfair labor practices are limited to conduct that 
is in the nature of coercion,24 while interference with free choice 
has been found to result from misrepresentations, fraud, or coer- 
~ i o n . ~ ~  
But, because the free choice standard is less restrictive than 
the standard applied to unfair labor practices, the finding of an 
unfair labor practice is, "[a] fortiori, conduct which interferes 
with the [employees'] exercise of free and untrammeled choice 
in [a representation] election."26 Thus, if the Board finds an 
unfair labor practice has occurred during the critical preelection 
period, the Board may without further inquiry conclude that 
there has been interference with the employees' free choice. The 
finding of an unfair labor practice in the representation election 
context is therefore important only in that it enables the NLRB 
to find that the employees' free choice has been interfered with 
without making a specific determination to that effect. 
B. Development of the Hollywood Ceramics Rule 
The Board's policy regarding the impact of the truth or fal- 
the Board than the proper limits of campaign propaganda and the impact of employer 
and union statements upon the employees' exercise of free choice." NLRB v. Golden Age 
Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26,30 (5th Cir. 1969). The Board's claim of expertise has not gone 
unchallenged, however. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 
U .  C H I .  L. REV. 681 (1972). 
21. See Raskin, supra note 19; Smither, supra note 20. 
22. Hicks-Hayward Co., I18 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 n. 1 (1957). 
23. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). 
24. 29 U.S.C. 4 158(a), (b) (1970). "The [NLRA] condemns only improper influence 
which is in the nature of coercion." J.S. Dillion & Sons Stores Co. v. NLRB, 338 F.2d 395, 
399 (10th Cir. 1964). 
25. See Sprague Ponce Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 281 (1970) (coercion interfered with election 
though no unfair labor practice found); Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962) 
(misrepresentation interfered with election); Shovel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1485 (1958) 
(threat couched in the form of an opinion interfered with election); United Aircraft Corp., 
103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953) (fraud interfered with election though no unfair labor practice 
found). 
26. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962). 
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sity of campaign propaganda on employee free choice was origi- 
nally one of n~ninterference.~' But in United Aircraft Gorp.," 
where one union distributed a forged telegram in which the op- 
posing union's president purportedly apologized for his union's 
improper conduct and praised the other union's president, the 
Board found that the employees' freedom of choice had been 
interfered with because it was impossible for the employees to 
recognize the forged telegram as campaign propaganda and dis- 
count it acc~rdingly.~~ In a later case, the Board stated that 
as a general rule, and in the absence of coercion, [the Board] 
will not undertake to censor or police union campaigns or to 
consider the truth or falsity of electioneering propaganda, unless 
the ability of the employees to evaluate such material has been 
so impaired by the campaign material or by campaign trickery 
that the uncoerced desires of the employees cannot be deter- 
mined.30 
In Gummed Products C O . , ~ ~  the Board overturned an election 
because a union's misstatement of wage rates in a competing 
unionized plant, made the day before the election, interfered with 
the employees' free choice of a bargaining representati~e.~~ The
Board recalled that it did not usually "censor or police preelection 
propaganda by parties to elections, absent threats or acts of vio- 
lence," but recognized that there were "some limits on campaign 
tactics."33 The Board observed that "[e]xaggerations, inaccura- 
cies, partial truths, name-calling, and falsehoods, while not con- 
doned, may be excused as legitimate propaganda, provided they 
are not so misleading as to prevent the exercise of a free choice 
by the employees in the election of their bargaining representa- 
tive. "34 
Then, in United States Gypsum Co.," the Board set aside an 
election won by the employer where, two days before the election, 
27. Union campaign propaganda was not examined, and employers were not permit- 
ted to campaign. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, supra note 9, a t  17-18. 
28. 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). 
29. Id. at 103-04. The Board returns to this level of campaign regulation in the instant 
case. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1708 
(1977). 
30. Radio Corp. of America, 106 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1394 (1953). 
31. 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955). 
32. Id. at  1094. 
33. Id. at  1093 (emphasis added). 
The limits referred to by the Board were the limits imposed in United Aircraft Corp., 
103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). 
34. Gummed Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. a t  1093-94. 
35. 130 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961). 
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the employer read to the employees a telegram containing delib- 
erate  misrepresentation^.^^ The Board held that 
when one of the parties deliberately misstates material facts 
which are within its special knowledge, under such circum- 
stances that the other party or parties cannot learn about them 
in time to point out the misstatements, and the employees 
themselves lack independent knowledge to make possible a 
proper evaluation of the misstatements the Board will find that 
the bounds of legitimate campaign propaganda have been ex- 
ceeded and will set aside an ele~tion.~' 
Finally, in Hollywood Ceramics C O . , ~ ~  the Board held that 
the union's misrepresentation of wage rates, made the day before 
the election, interfered with the employees' free choice of a bar- 
gaining repre~entative.~~ Because wage rates are a matter of ut- 
most concern to the employees, the Board found that any mis- 
representations of wage rates could have had a significant impact 
on the election.40 The Board overruled cases previously requiring 
that misrepresentations must be deliberate41 and stated its new 
rule for the regulation of campaign misstatements: 
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a 
misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which 
involves a substantial departure from the truth, a t  a time which 
prevents the other party or parties from making an effective 
reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, 
may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the 
election.42 
Until the decision in the instant case, the Board considered the 
36. The telegram said that the employees had no voice in accepting the contract the 
union was negotiating with the employer and that the union was preventing the employer 
from granting wage increases. Id. at  902-03. 
37. Id. at  904. The Board stated the rule in terms of legitimate campaign propaganda 
rather than in terms of interference with free choice, but the holding in United States 
Gypsum makes it clear that there had been interference with free choice. Both earlier (e.g., 
Gummed Products) and later (e.g. ,  Hollywood Ceramics) cases indicate that the 
"ultimate consideration [in evaluation of campaign propaganda] is whether the chal- 
lenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning to the point where the 
uninhibited desires of the employees cannot be determined in an election." Gummed 
Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1094. The Board in fact found that free choice had been 
interfered with when it said that the "bounds of legitimate campaign propaganda have 
been exceeded." United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B. at  904. 
38. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). 
39. Id. at 225. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at  224 n.8. 
42. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Hollywood Ceramics rule to be "the definitive statement of its 
policies regarding campaign  misrepresentation^."^^ 
Holding that it would no longer look into the truth or falsity 
of campaign propaganda, the NLRB overruled the Hollywood 
Ceramics rule in the instant case.44 The Board felt that the rule 
did not serve to protect the employees' freedom of choice, but 
rather "tended to impede the attainment of that In addi- 
tion, the Board found numerous ill effects produced by the 
Hollywood Ceramics rule, "includ[ing] extensive analysis of 
campaign propaganda, restriction of free speech, variance in ap- 
plication as between the Board and the courts, increasing litiga- 
tion, and a resulting decrease in the finality of the election re- 
sults," and attributed these ill effects to the "nature of the stan- 
d a r d ~ " ~ ~  employed by the Board.47 The Board saw the variance 
- 
43. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, supra note 9, a t  26. 
44. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (NLRB 1977). Two members 
of the Board, Fanning and Jenkins, dissented. Id. at 1709. 
The majority made it clear, however, that the holding in the instant case did not 
affect the Board's policy of regulating "campaign conduct which interferes with employee 
free choice outside the area of misrepresentation." Id. at 1708. The Board noted also that 
the United Aircraft rule was also unaffected by the holding in the instant case and that 
elections would continue to be overturned where forged documents make it impossible for 
employees to recognize campaign propaganda because of its misleading form. Id. at 1708 
n.27. 
45. Id. at  1706. 
The Board emphasized that it had the authority to decline to probe into the truth or 
falsity of campaign statements. Id. at 1705. Relying on NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 
324 (1946), the Board stated that "the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Board 
possesses a 'wide degree of discretion' in performing its function of establishing policies 
and procedures to safeguard the conduct of representation elections." 94 L.R.R.M. a t  
1706. The Board also cited NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), in which 
"the Court held that [the Board's] administrative discretion in the decisionmaking pro- 
cess necessarily includes the authority to revise or modify principles previously adopted." 
94 L.R.R.M. at 1706. The Board found further support in a Fifth Circuit case which 
acknowledged that the laboratory-conditions standard was "adopted originally by the 
Board, not the courts, and, accordingly, is controlling only 'until the Board announces a 
change and its reasons for the change.' " 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706 (quoting Foremost Dairies 
of the South v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
46. "If a standard of truth and accuracy could actually provide an admin- 
istrable norm, something might be said for adopting such a view. But this 
possibility tends to dissolve on more careful analysis. In the welter of words 
exchanged during a heated campaign, it  is plaintly [sic] impractical to inter- 
vene upon every misstatement made by the agents of the union or the employer. 
Thus, judges and administrators have long recognized that inaccurate or mis- 
leading assertions should be proscribed only under certain conditions. These 
qualifications, however, immediately begin to blur the line between the licit and 
illicit." . . . 
. . . .  
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between the Board's and the courts' application of the Hollywood 
Ceramics rule as producing protracted litigation and further 
delay in the implementation of the employees' choice of bargain- 
ing representati~e.~~ 
The major reason for the Board's rejection of the Hollywood 
Ceramics rule was its belief that the employees did not need the 
Board's protection from campaign  misrepresentation^.^^ The ma- 
jority reasoned that employees are "mature individuals who are 
capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and 
discounting it. "50 In short, the Board found that misrepresen- 
tations do not affect the employees' free and untrammeled choice 
of bargaining  representative^.^^ Support for this conclusion was 
found in a recent study of voter behavior in representation elec- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  The study had indicated that voting decisions are based 
on precampaign predilection, that voters generally pay little at- 
tention to the campaigns, and that misrepresentations do not 
significantly affect voter choice.53 
In the instant case, the NLRB reversed a longstanding policy 
of regulating campaign misrepresentations without making sub- 
stantial changes in the traditional framework of campaign regula- 
tion. While part of the Board's regulatory scheme was rejected, 
the basic premises of regulation stayed unchanged: impairment 
of free choice remains the measure of impermissible election in- 
t e r fe ren~e .~~ 
. . . Professor Bok concluded that restrictions on the content of campaign 
propaganda requiring truthful and accurate statements "resist every effort at 
clear formulation and tend inexorably to give rise to vague and inconsistent 
rulings which baffle the parties and provoke litigation." 
94 L.R.R.M. at 1706 (quoting Bok, supra note 15, at 85, 92). 
47. Id. 
The dissent in the instant case did not find the ill effects claimed by the majority to 
be of any significance. See id. a t  1710-12. 
48. Id. at 1707. See, e.g., Lake Odessa Mach. Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 
1975); La Crescent Constant Care Center, Inc., 510 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1974); Henderson 
Trumbull Supply Corp., 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974). 
49. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. 
52. Id. The study referred to was Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions 
Underlying NLRB Regulation of  Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical 
Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976). The complete findings of the study were subse- 
quently published in J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, supra note 18. 
53. Getman & Goldberg, supra note 52, at 283. 
54. 94 L.R.R.M. a t  1707. 
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A. Continued Existence of Free Choice Framework in 
Campaign Regulation 
The Board supported its attack on the Hollywood Ceramics 
rule by, first, finding numerous ill effects attributable to the 
rule's applicationJ5 and, second, finding that campaign misrepre- 
sentations did not, in fact, affect free choice.56 In support of this 
latter conclusion, the NLRB referred to an empirical study sup- 
porting its view that misrepresentations did not interfere with 
free 
It is the second finding, that misrepresentations do not affect 
free choice, that spelled the death knell for Hollywood Ceramics. 
The rule's purported ill effects and the empirical study are not 
essential to the holding in the instant caseJ8 and can probably be 
viewed merely as further justificationJ9 for the demise of the 
Hollywood Ceramics rule. The rule had originally been adopted 
to protect the employees' freedom of choice;60 when in the instant 
case the Board determined that campaign misrepresentations do 
not actually affect freedom of choice, the rule became surplusage 
and rejection of the rule followed directly. Thus, the free choice 
test that had once provided the reason for the birth of the 
Hollywood Ceramics rule, twenty years later has provided the 
reason for its demise? 
The Board was careful to keep the free choice test intact. The 
free choice test, it should be noted, has been used by the Board 
to justify regulations of the time," place," and manner" of elec- 
55. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. 
56. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707. 
57. Id. 
58. The NLRB would have continued to administer the Hollywood Ceramics rule in 
spite of its ill effects if the Board had believed that misrepresentations interfered with the 
employees' free choice. Id. 
59. The Board was careful to show that it had the authority to overrule Hollywood 
Ceramics-possibly indicating a concern about the acceptance of the holding in the in- 
stant case. See id. at 1705-06. 
60. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962). The Board has said that 
the basic purpose of election regulation "is to assure the employees full and complete 
freedom of choice in selecting a bargaining representative." Id. 
61. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708. 
While indicating that the assumptions that produced the Hollywood Ceramics rule 
probably never had any validity, the Board said that improvements in education and 
employee sophistication over the years have made their validity even more doubtful. Id. 
at 1707. 
62.  E.g., Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) (prohibits campaign 
speeches made on company time within 24 hours of an election). 
63. E.g., Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957) (noncoercive employer inter- 
views at employees' homes interferes with free choice); Spartan Aircraft Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 
1373 (1955) (electioneering near polls interferes with free choice). 
64. E.g., General Shoe Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499, 501 (1951): ''[qhe technique of 
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tioneering without regard to content? The retention of the free 
choice standard saves the Board the trouble of developing a new 
standard or analytical framework for the regulation of campaign 
propaganda that may or may not have been readily accepted by 
the courts." The decision in the instant case also preserves a 
standard that the Board has found particularly useful. The free 
choice standard is both respectablew and flexible." Perhaps un- 
fortunately, however, the combination of the free choice standard 
and the Board's claimed and accepted expertisea in determining 
when the standard has been breached invites the Board to substi- 
tute conclusions for analysis.70 
Because the Board was able to retain the free choice test 
while rejecting the Hollywood Ceramics rule, the holding of the 
instant case should produce a minimal disruptive effect on the 
NLRB's regulation of representation elections. NLRB supervision 
will continue as before except that the substance of a misrepre- 
sentation will no longer provide a basis for the setting aside of 
representation election results.71 But, misrepresentations may 
still result in the overturning of an election because of the manner 
in which they are made.72 The Board has indicated that deceptive 
campaign practices involving the Board or its processes or the use 
of forged documents will result in the overturning of an election 
under the holding in the instant case.73 This result is essentially 
the level of campaign regulation set out in United Aircraft Corp. 74 
calling the employees into the Employer's offices individually and in small groups and 
there urging that they reject the Union [is] in itself conduct which [interferes with free 
choice] ." 
65. Possible alternative justifications for the regulation of campaign conduct are 
fairness and propriety. See Bok, supra note 15, a t  53-57. 
66. See note 59 supra. 
67. The free choice standard has been around since 1948. General Shoe Corp. 77 
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). The courts have accepted the free choice standard and applied 
it in their review of Board decisions. See, e.g., Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298, 
303 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 32 (5th Cir. 1969). 
68. The holding in the instant case demonstrates the flexibility of the free choice 
standard. See notes 58, 60-63 and accompanying text supra. 
69. See note 20 supra. 
70. See Asher, NLRB Representation Elections-Some of the Problems Confronting 
Unions, 17 N.Y. CONF. LAB. 213, 221-22 (1964). 
Because of the ad hoc nature of the Board's regulation of campaign propaganda, 
requiring an analysis of the reasons for overturning an election in a particular case may 
not be especially useful as a guide for the conduct of others; the requirement does, how- 
ever, ensure that the decision in the particular case is somewhat reasoned. 
71. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. See Formoc, Inc., 96 L.R.R.M. 1393 (NLRB 1977). 
74. 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). 
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twenty-four years ago-only where it is impossible for employees 
to recognize information as campaign propaganda will misrepre- 
sentations be found to violate the free choice rule.75 
B. Implications i n  the  Coercive Propaganda Context 
The Board's rationale in the instant case adequately explains 
why it overruled Hollywood Ceramics, and perhaps no more 
should be expected. However, the rationale used by the Board 
creates a troublesome conflict. The Board treats coercive propa- 
ganda differently than misrepresentations, notwithstanding the 
fact that the Board's rationale in the instant case is as applicable 
to coercive propaganda as it is to  misrepresentation^.^^ 
The ill effects the Board found attributable to the Hollywood 
Ceramics rule are also produced by the regulation of campaign 
propaganda that is threatening or coercive according to the 
Board's standards. Those ill effects "include extensive analysis of 
campaign propaganda, restriction of free speech, variance in ap- 
plication [of the rule] as between the Board and the courts, 
increasing litigation, and a resulting decrease in the finality of 
election results."77 Yet, the Board has indicated it intends to 
continue regulating coercive campaign propaganda despite any 
possible "ill effects."78 Therefore, the holding in the instant case 
may not dispel the "ill effects" specifically cited by the Board as 
products of the Hollywood Ceramics rule. A n y  regulation of cam- 
paign propaganda, whether for misrepresentation or coercion, 
must necessarily involve extensive analysis of campaign propa- 
ganda. Also implicit in any scheme of campaign regulation is 
some restriction of free speech.79 The Board and the courts have 
also differed as to when propaganda believed to be coercive has 
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice, and the vari- 
ance has produced the same protracted litigation that plagued 
the Hollywood Ceramics rule.80 Whenever the Board overturns an 
75. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra. 
76. 94 L.R.R.M. a t  1712 (dissenting opinion). 
77. Id. a t  1706 (majority opinion). 
78. Id. a t  1708. 
79. The Board cannot regulate the content of campaign statements without placing 
limits on what may be said. For example, the dissent in the instant case maintained that 
misrepresentations do not fall under the protection of the first amendment. Id. a t  1712. 
The laboratory-conditions (free choice) standard was developed by the Board to circum- 
vent the free speech clause of the NLRA. R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K.  Hum, supra note 
9, a t  9. 
80. See, e.g., Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1972); National 
Can Corp. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1967). 
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election, whether because the campaign propaganda is mislead- 
ing or because it is coercive, the finality of the election is post- 
poned and litigation is increased accordingly. 
Ironically, the empirical study relied upon by the Board 
makes no distinction between the effects of misleading campaign 
propaganda and the effects of coercive propaganda on employee 
voting beha~ior .~ '  The study found that "[vloting behavior in 
elections involving campaign tactics believed [by the Board] to 
be coercive is not significantly different from voting behavior in 
campaigns that conform to the Board's standard of 'laboratory 
conditions.' "82 The study found that union supporters are likely 
to perceive threats in ambiguous statements made by their em- 
ployers, but the data indicated that the perceived threats did not 
affect the employees' voting beha~ior.~V3pecifically, the study 
showed that "[e]mployees who want union representation vote 
for the union despite threats or promises designed to cause them 
to do ~ the rwise . "~~  The study recommended that "[tlhe Board 
should no longer set aside elections or find unfair labor practices 
based on written or oral campaign communications by employers 
or unions ."85 
Thus, both the ill effects produced by the regulation of coer- 
cive campaign propaganda and the results of the empirical study 
could support a Board conclusion, similar to that in the instant 
case, tha t  coercive propaganda does not affect employee free 
choice. The Board, as noted, however, has expressly indicated 
81. The article cited by the Board was only a partial summary of the empirical study, 
and was limited to the misrepresentation aspect of the Board's regulation of campaign 
propaganda. The complete findings were later published in J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & 
J. HERMAN, supra note 18. The Book made no distinction between coercive propaganda 
and misleading propaganda. See id. at  150. Thus, empirical evidence of the quality used 
to support the Board's finding as to misrepresentations exists to support the contention 
that propaganda found coercive by the Board also does not affect employee free choice. 
The Board's reliance on the law review article rather than the book, if consciously 
made, would imply that it did not agree with the conclusions in the book as to coercive 
propaganda. Although there is nothing in the majority opinion to indicate knowledge of 
the book, the dissent was familiar with it, and it can be fairly inferred that the majority 
was also knowledgeable. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. a t  1712 (dissenting 
opinion). 
For a comment on the complete empirical study, see Symposium-Four Perspectives 
on Union Representation Elections: Law & Reality, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1976). 
82. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, supra note 18, a t  146. 
83. Id. a t  141. 
84. Id. a t  147. 
85. Id. a t  150. The study suggests that NLRB regulation of election campaigns comes 
too late in the employees' decisionmaking process to provide any protection. Those em- 
ployees susceptible to coercion are coerced long before the regulated preelection period 
begins. See id. at  129. 
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that it will continue to regulate coercive campaign propaganda, 
but in so doing gave no reasons for its apparent inconsisten~y.~~ 
The instant case implies that the distinguishing feature of mis- 
representations as compared to coercive propaganda is that mis- 
representations do not, in the Board's view, affect free choice.87 
Deregulation of propaganda presently regarded as coercive awaits 
only a Board composed of three members willing to conclude that 
such propaganda does not affect free choice. Available empirical 
data could easily support such a conclusion. 
C .  Alternative Rationales 
Since the empirical study relied upon by the Board supports 
the proposition that neither campaign misrepresentation nor 
coercive propaganda affects the outcome of union elections, the 
Board's decision to deregulate the one activity but not the other 
seems contradictory. The Board could have reconciled that con- 
tradiction in a number of ways. 
The contradiction could have been avoided by a Board find- 
ing that the study was spurious with respect to coercive propa- 
ganda. While this approach eliminates the contradiction, it is not 
analytically sound. There seems to be no reason to weigh the 
empirical evidence more heavily in one case than in another. 
Alternatively, the Board could have reconciled its decision 
with the empirical data by relying upon the presumption that 
certain types of activity affect free choice. The Board could have 
concluded that the empirical data was strong enough to overcome 
a weaker presumption that misrepresentations influence voting 
behavior, but not strong enough to overcome a much stronger 
presumption that coercive propaganda influences voting behav- 
ior. Common sense would allow such a weighing of the two pre- 
sumptions in relationship to the data. This conclusion would also 
seem to flow naturally from the premise that coercion may 
amount to an unfair labor practice, which would certainly be a 
violation of the free choice test.88 
In the pagt the Board has not required that coercion (in the 
case of unfair labor practices) or coercive propaganda (in the case 
of interference with free choice) actually influence the employees 
or that it actually affect the outcome of the election." Rather, the 
86. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708. 
87. The dissent in the instant case expressed fear that the majority's ultimate pur- 
pose may be the deregulation of campaign propaganda. Id. at 1712 (dissenting opinion). 
88. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra. 
89. E.g., NLRB v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 500 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) (unfair 
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Board has looked to the character and circumstances of the objec- 
tionable conduct in determining if the coercive propaganda has 
affected free choice.g0 Thus, as an alternative to the inherently 
contradictory rationale in the instant case, empirical evidence 
concerning the actual effects of coercive propaganda could have 
explicitly been found to have no bearing on the Board's present 
policy toward the regulation of campaign propaganda. 
Lastly, an alternative rationale may be discerned from the 
purpose of the NLRA itself. Congress has expressed an intent to 
protect employees from being coerced or restrained in their free 
choice of bargaining  representative^.^' Implicit in this expression 
of congressional intent is the conclusion that threats and coercion 
do affect the employees' freedom of choice. Congress has not 
manifested any similar intent to protect employees from the ef- 
fects of misrepresentations. Given the employer's economic power 
over the employees, and the employees' certain awareness of 
that power, the conclusion appears entirely rational. Thus, the 
Board could have expressly concluded that any change in policy 
regarding the regulation of coercive propaganda should be left to 
Congress, but that it was free to change its policy regarding mis- 
representations. 
Any of the above methods could have been used by the Board 
to avoid the contradiction that resulted from the Board's reliance 
on the empirical study. The Board failed, however, to make any 
attempt in the instant case to define the role such studies should 
play in Board decisions. The Board's uncritical acceptance of the 
study places a stamp of approval on techniques and conclusions 
that are far from infallible. Rather than treating the evidence in 
an authoritative manner, a better reasoned course would have 
been to emphasize the fallibility of empirical evidence and to 
relegate it to a minor role. The correctness of law or policy should 
not be determined by statistical surveys. 
labor practice); Westside Hosp., 218 N.L.R.B. 96 (1975) (interference with free choice); 
Steak House Meat Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 28 (1973) (interference with free choice); Central 
Photocolor Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 839 (1972) (interference with free choice). 
But, before the Board will find that a misrepresentation has interfered with free 
choice, the misrepresentation must be found to have had a significant impact on voter 
choice. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962). 
90. Steak House Meat Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 28 (1973); Central Photocolor Co., 195 
N.L.R.B. 839 (1972). 
91. 29 U.S.C. $158(a)(l) (1970) (employer coercion); id. 8 158(b)(l) (union coercion). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Board in the instant case accomplished its purpose-the 
deregulation of misrepresentations-but in doing so left two ques- 
tions unanswered: (1) What part should empirical data play in 
Board decisions?, and (2) What, given the rationale in the instant 
case, distinguishes the regulation of coercive propaganda from 
the regulation of misrepresentations? The latter question could 
have been answered in any one of the ways previously discussed. 
Considering the Board's plainly expressed desire to continue reg- 
ulation of coercive propaganda, the Board, if pushed to it, will 
likely distinguish the regulation of coercive propaganda in some 
way. However, an answer to the latter question may, but will not 
necessarily, resolve the first. In the decisionmaking process, the 
Board should take empirical data into consideration only after 
* 
careful evaluation. Empirical data is not so accurate as to war- 
rant the Board placing unflinching confidence on it. 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
